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What Hath Ovitz Wrouqht?
F or more than 60 years, a feud has raged between artists' man-
7 agers and talent agents. In part, this has to do with philosoph-
-Am ical differences concerning the role which each plays in the
development and furtherance of their clients' careers, and in part it con-
cerns the levels of compensation each can receive. As a general rule of
thumb, the job of an agent is to find work for his/her clients, whereas the
job of a manager is to guide and develop the client's career. Of equal
importance is the manner in which they are regarded by prevailing law.
AGENTS MANAGERS
Agents have been heavily regulated by state legislation in New York
and California and by guild franchising agreements. For example, Actors
Equity, which represents actors in the theatre, only permits its members to
deal with agents who are licensed (i.e., "franchised") by the union. The
union, among other things, insists that agents not commission the min-
imum "scale" payments negotiated between the union and the producers.'
By Donald E. Biederman
However, until now, managers were not subject to an
overall regulatory scheme established by legislation or by
the entertainment guilds.
Managers have lived in a sort of never-land, vulnera-
ble to potentially disastrous results if they step over the
line into the role of agent. The management agreement of
a manager who procures work for a client can be nulli-
fied, even where the client has encouraged the manager
to do so. Managers feel ill-used by this treatment.
2
Robert Wachs, an extremely experienced and highly suc-
cessful manager who figures prominently in the develop-
ment of case law in this area, puts the matter this way:
If an actor or actress comes out to make a
career in Hollywood, how do they get work?
They can't go to a manager because a manag-
er is not allowed to get them work ... So you
have to have an agent. But you can't get an
agent because you don't have any credits yet.
So you have to get a manager to develop your
talent. But the manager can't get you work, so
no one ends up doing it. In reality, the agent
only wants to book once you've got a part or a
career, but they do not want to work to devel-
op the talent. So the [Talent Agencies] Act,
which is supposed to be protecting talent,
makes them suffer because their careers are
going nowhere. So it has fallen on the man-
agers to try to help. And when the manager
then submits their clients for jobs, they are
soliciting work and violating the Act. ... We're
talking about nothing but success that the
manager helped accomplish. And then the Act
allows the client to sabotage the manager-
every good piece of work he's done for the
client. .... Every manager, every single manag-
er is in violation of the Act, except for [those
who manage] the big stars [who don't need
help procuring contracts].
3
In recent years, this established tension has been further
exacerbated as managers-until now, the most promi-
nent being Brillstein-Grey Entertainment-have
branched out into developing film and television produc-
tions with their management clients. Agents, meanwhile,
are prohibited by law from doing this because of the con-
flict of interests it creates. Now, as a result of the found-
ing by former superagent Michael Ovitz of Artists
Management Group (who, presumably, will develop proj-
ects in the same manner as Brillstein-Grey), and the
introduction of a California bill-AB 884-by Assembly
Member Sheila James Kuehl, 4 the tension in the
California entertainment community has been ratcheted
up considerably. This comes "at a time when there are
challenges to the traditional structure of talent represen-
tation, not to mention profit equations of the entertain-
ment industry as a whole."
5
How serious is this? According to Tom Pollock, long-
time "A-list" entertainment attorney and former head of
Universal Pictures:
Something's going to have to happen because
the playing field's not level. Either the man-
agers will end up being regulated by both the
state and the guilds, or the next time the
guilds' franchises come up the agencies won't
sign them. Why shouldn't they be able to own
pieces of movies when managers already can?
6
As an example of this phenomenon, DAILY VARIETY
reported on March 19, 1999, that New Line Cinema had
acquired feature film rights to Tess Gerritson's novel
GRAVITY for $1,000,000 (with another $500,000 to be paid
upon production), and that the film would be produced by
Michael Ovitz's Artists Management Group. According to
DAILY VARIETY, "AMG will likely package the project with
as many of the banner's [sic] clients as possible."
' 7
At first blush, this issue might seem to concern only
those resident in or whose businesses are based in New
York and California. The expansive nature of long-arm
jurisdiction, however, should make this issue one of con-
cern to managers in other states who conduct any busi-
ness with clients or production companies located in the
major markets of New York or California. Moreover, the
fact that an individual is licensed to practice law will not
necessarily provide insulation against the impact of leg-
islation regulating agents.
In this article, we will review the history of
California's Talent Agencies Act8 and the comparable
New York statute, 9 with an analysis of the leading cases
which have arisen under each act, and discuss the cur-
rent controversy and pending legislation.
MAKING THE GRADE ON THE A-LIST
Agents and managers have played extremely impor-
tant roles in the entertainment industries for more than
a 100 years. Legendary agents such as Jules Stein and
Lew Wasserman of MCA;10 Sam Weisbord and Abe
Lastfogel of the William Morris Agency;' 1 Sam Cohn of
International Creative Management; Michael Ovitz, Ron
Meyer, and Bill Haber of Creative Artists Agency;
12
Irving "Swifty" Lazar;13 and David Geffen
14 have-for
good or ill-left a huge footprint.
So, too, have managers. The late British manager
Gordon Mills, for example, was instrumental in creating
and advancing the careers of Tom Jones, Engelbert
Humperdinck, and Gilbert O'Sullivan. Mills not only
managed these artists and produced their recordings, he
created personae for them. Tom Jones (born Matthews)
was cast by Mills as a sex symbol in tight black clothing,
Engelbert Humperdinck (born Gerry Dorsey) as a suave
smoothie in a tuxedo, and Gilbert (born Raymond)
O'Sullivan as something of a geek with a bowl haircut, a
red college sweatshirt with "G" on it, and short pants.
The skyrocketing early success and ultimate meltdown of
the relationship between Mills and O'Sullivan is recount-
ed in O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music,
Ltd.15 Similarly, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a San
Francisco-based manager, Matthew Katz, was instrumen-
tal in advancing the careers of such acts as It's A Beautiful
Day, Moby Grape, and Jefferson Airplane. The decline and
fall of the relationship between Katz and Jefferson
Airplane is described in Buchwald v. Superior Court.
16
In recent years, as the economics of the entertainment
industries became more and more "hit-driven," a number
of leading performers (such as Harrison Ford, Kevin Costner,
Jackie Chan, and Sharon Stone) have stopped working with
agents and instead rely solely on their managers.
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Inevitably, clashes occurred between agents and man-
agers, and between managers and their clients. In the
former instance, this took the form of legislation
designed to protect the agents' "turf." In the latter, this
took the form of lawsuits in New York and proceedings
before the Labor Commissioner in California. And now,
to borrow a phrase from the legendary Al Jolson, it looks
like "you ain't seen nothin' yet!"
TURF X/AR OVER TALENT AGENCIES
New York and California have been the primary cen-
ters for both agents and managers, so it is not surprising
that the principal legislation in this area was enacted in
those states. 18 The two statutes have a lot in common;
however, there are a number of significant distinctions
between them.
New York
In New York, the legislation embodied in §§170-190 of
the General Business Law was designed to regulate
"employment agencies," with "theatrical employment
agency" being a subset. 19 The statute applies to:
any person ... who procures or attempts to pro-
cure employment or engagements for [a virtu-
ally encyclopedic range of talent] ... but such
term does not include the business of managing
such entertainments, exhibitions or perform-
ances, or the artists or attractions constituting
the same, where such business only incidental-
ly involves the seeking of employment therefor"
(emphasis supplied).
A talent agent must be licensed by the Commissioner of
Labor (for agents located in New York City, by the
Commissioner of Consumer Affairs),
20 who investigates
the applicant for character and responsibility.
2 1 The
license fee is $200 at issuance ($400 if the agency has
more than four employees) and a $5,000 bond is required.
A written contract is required, 22 and the maximum fee
chargeable for "theatrical engagements"
2 3 is ten percent
of "the compensation paid" to the talent, with an excep-
tion allowing a fee of 20 percent for "engagements for
orchestras and employment or engagements in the opera
and concert fields."24
The Commissioner is empowered to suspend or revoke
an agency license for "violat[ion] of any provision of this
article or [if the agent] is not a person of good character
and responsibility."2 5 The action of the Commissioner is
subject to review by the New York Supreme Court
2 6 in a
so-called "Article 78 proceeding," in which the "substan-
tial evidence" rule generally applicable to review of
administrative decisions applies.2 7 In addition, violation
of the article can constitute a misdemeanor punishable
by imprisonment for up to a year and/or a fine of not
more than $1,000.28 Criminal proceedings may be insti-
tuted by the Commissioner or by "any person aggrieved
by such violations."2 9 The Commissioner has no power to
nullify contracts between the artist and agent, nor does
the Commissioner have power to order an agent to return
commissions already paid to the agent. Moreover, the
Commissioner has no power to hear complaints against
unlicensed agents. Aggrieved artists must pursue their
remedies in the New York Supreme Court.
Cdlifornid
At first glance, California's statute has many things in
common with New York's. A talent agent must obtain a
license from the Labor Commissioner.
30 The applicant
must be a person of "good moral character" (corporate
agencies must have a "reputation for fair dealing")3 1 with
two years' experience in a business or occupation. 32 The
initial license fee is $25, and there is an annual renewal
fee of $225.33 An agent's contract forms are subject to
approval by the Commissioner, who may withhold them
if they are "unfair, unjust and oppressive to the artist.
34
While fee limitations are not prescribed legislatively,
contrary to the case in New York, California agents' fees
are limited in practice to ten percent by guild franchising
agreements and by the Commissioner's review power
during licensure. Agency contract forms must provide for
referral of "any controversy" to the Labor Commissioner
"for adjustment. '3 5 An agent must maintain his/her/its
clients' funds in a separate trust account, and monies
received by an agent on behalf of a client must be dis-
bursed within 30 days, except where there is a valid off-
set in favor of the agent.
3 6
As is the case in New York, there is an extremely
broad definition of "theatrical engagement. ' 37 A talent
agency is defined to engage in:
the occupation of procuring, offering, promis-
ing or attempting to procure employment or
engagements for an artist or artists, except
that the activities of procuring, offering, or
promising to procure recording contracts for an
artist or artists shall not of itself subject to per-
son or corporation to regulation and licensing
under this chapter,'3 8 (emphasis supplied).
In addition to the recording-contracts exception, "[i]t is
License and Refjistration, Please
If d Manager is Caught Acting as an
Unlicensed Agent in Violation of the
California Talent Agencies Act:
1. The management contract is
void from inception.
2. Past commissions pdid to the
manager may 6e required to be
returned to the artist.
3. All commissions owed to the
manager 6y the artist are discharged.
not unlawful ... to act in conjunction with, and at the
request of, a licensed talent agent in the negotiation of an
employment contract. ' 39 The two exceptions were enact-
ed in the early 1980s as part of the Waters Amendment,
carried by then-Assembly Member (now U.S.
Representative) Maxine Waters of Los Angeles. The
recording contracts exception was enacted to recognize
the business reality that a recording artist could not
secure the services of an agent without a recording agree-
ment. Thus, managers almost universally handled such
matters, thereby exposing themselves to being dis-
charged once their clients experienced success. The
exception for managers working with agents was simi-
larly based upon the business reality that managers and
agents customarily worked as part of an overall repre-
sentative team. In addition to these reforms, the amend-
ment removed criminal penalties for violations of the Talent
Agencies Act and established a one-year statute of limitations.
Thus, California, too, provides some comfort for man-
agers, albeit less broadly than New York. However, since
talent agencies "may counsel, or direct artists in the
development of their professional careers,"40 it is easy to
see why the traditional agents are alarmed at what they
perceive as an increasing invasion of their turf by essen-
tially unregulated competition.
Where the two statutes part company most dramati-
cally is in the area of enforcement. In "cases of contro-
versy arising under [the Talent Agencies Act]," the
Commissioner "shall hear and determine the same, sub-
ject to an appeal within 10 days after determination to
the superior court where the same shall be heard de
novo."4 1 However, under California Labor Code
§1700.45, an agency agreement may provide for private
arbitration if (1) enumerated in the agency agreement, in
the union rules applicable to "franchising agreements,"
or in such agreements themselves, and (2) the contract
provides for reasonable notice to the Commissioner and
an opportunity for the Commissioner to attend all arbi-
tration hearings.
MANAGING MANAGERS IN COURT
The New York and California statutes have fared very
differently in the courts. The Labor Commissioner
appears to have been far more active in this area than
the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, and there have
been many more lawsuits in California.
New York
There have been three major court cases under the
New York statute: Mandel v. Liebman 42 Pine v. Laine,
43
and Gershunov v. Panov.
44
In Mandel, a legendary television producer fired his
manager (who happened to be a licensed attorney,
although not functioning as an attorney vis-a-vis
Liebman). Mandel's management agreement with
Liebman provided for a five-year term and a ten percent
commission applicable in perpetuity to all contracts
entered into during the term.4 5 The agreement stated
that Liebman "employ[ed]" Mandel to "use his ability and
experience as [a] manager and personal representative"
to further Liebman's career and to "advise him in con-
nection with all offers of employment and contracts for
services, and conclude for him such contracts." Mandel
was only required to devote as much time and attention
to Liebman's affairs as Mandel's "opinion and judgment
deem[ed] necessary."
Liebman argued that the agreement was uncon-
scionable and lacking in mutuality. The Court of
Appeals 46 rejected the unconscionability argument by
reviewing the agreement in light of industry custom and
usage, stating that the description of Mandel as
Liebman's "personal representative and manager" was
sufficient to constitute a commitment on Mandel's part to
provide customary services. As to the provision leaving
the amount of time dedicated to managerial duties to
Mandel's discretion, the Court of Appeals regarded this
simply as a recognition that Mandel might have other
clients beside Liebman, and thus he would have to budg-
et his time. The court similarly rejected Liebman's argu-
ment that since Mandel was an attorney, the manage-
ment agreement was in essence a retainer agreement,
which generally allows for a client to fire his attorney at
any time. It explained that since Mandel's services might
be performed as adequately by a non-lawyer as by a
lawyer, Mandel had not served as Liebman's attorney.
Finally, the court rejected Liebman's argument that
Mandel was an unlicensed talent agent in violation of the
General Business Law by pointing out the management
exception in GBL §171 and by citing provisions in their
contract. The contract stated that it "does not in any way
contemplate that [Mandel] shall act as agent for the pur-
pose of procuring further contracts or work for
[Liebman]," that Mandel was "not required in any way to
procure" employment for Liebman, and that in the event
that Liebman needed further work "then an agent shall
be employed by [Liebman] to procure such employment
and the services of said agent shall be separately paid
for" by Liebman. As will be seen, the deference accorded
by the Court of Appeals to the terms of the agreement is
far greater than that accorded by the Labor
Commissioner and by the California courts.
The Pine decision held that the "incidental manage-
ment" exception was unavailable where the sole activity
of the purported "manager" consisted of negotiating a
record deal (and the performer already had a manager).
Thus, New York does not judicially recognize the equiva-
lent of California's recording-contracts exception.
In Gershunov, a well-known impresario/manager, flu-
ent in Russian, signed two Russian ballet artists who had
emigrated to Israel. The agreement between them pro-
vided for a fee of 20 percent of the artists' earnings. If,
however, Gershonov acted as a promoter for any engage-
ment, the fees for such services would be negotiated
between them. As the Panovs became more experienced,
they became increasingly dissatisfied with Gershunov,
who sued them for damages and injunctive relief. They
countersued for an accounting of past receipts, as well as
for the value of engagements which Gershunov had
rejected without consulting them. They accused him
additionally of general misconduct in his fiduciary capac-
ity. Citing an instance in which Gershunov had received
$25,000 to "promote" a concert in Philadelphia (when he
had borne little or no risk), plus a $4,000 fee from the
$20,000 paid to the Panovs for that appearance, the
lower court found Gershunov guilty of a conflict of inter-
est and ordered him to forfeit both fees. This result was
upheld on appeal. Thus, the courts recognized that the man-
agement exception under GBL §171(8) was to be read in
light of normal principles governing conflict of interest.
Cdlifornia
In contrast to New York, California has experienced a
plethora of administrative and judicial decisions, begin-
ning with Raden v. Laurie. 47 In that case, the California
Supreme Court held that an individual who merely
worked to develop his client's poise and skills and took
her to auditions, without ever directly seeking employment
for her, was a personal manager rather than an agent.
Greater involvement in the employment process, how-
ever, led the court in Buchwald v. Superior Court to con-
clude that a manager was acting as an unlicensed
agent. 48 In this case, Matthew Katz had signed Jefferson
Airplane to what one author termed "the blessed trinity
of contracts:"'49 agreements signing the band to Katz for
management, to Katz's record production company, and
to Katz's music publishing company. Such situations
were by no means uncommon in the 1960s 5° and are still
encountered today. When disputes arose, Katz tried to
enforce a contractual arbitration provision; the band
went to the Labor Commission. Despite Katz's argument
that the Commissioner lacked jurisdiction over him
because he had not obtained a talent agent's license, a
federal district court found for the Commissioner. The
Talent Agencies Act, the court stated, was a remedial
statute enacted for the protection of artists, and thus it
should be construed liberally in favor of those whom the
statute was intended to protect. Artists were not to be
ordinarily considered as being in pari delicto with unli-
A d nasers ave lived in
a sort oF never-land,
vulnerable to potentia y
diisdstrous results iF they
step over thline
into the role oF daent.
censed agents with
whom they contract-
ed, and so a contract
between an artist and
an unlicensed agent








in their contract that
Katz was not an
agent and that Katz would not offer, attempt, or promise
to obtain work for the band. The agreements between
Katz and Jefferson Airplane were "wholly invalid"-
including the clause requiring private arbitration.
The substance of their relationship, rather than the
contractual form, controlled Buchwald. This was a far
different result from the New York Court of Appeals in
Mandel v. Liebman. 5 1 The ascendancy of substance over
form is qualified, however, as shown by the subsequent
decision of the Labor Commissioner in Ivy v. Howard.
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In that case, the special hearing officer voided an agree-
ment which provided that the personal manager would
attempt to procure personal engagements for the client,
and which lacked a "severability" clause under which the
offending provisions might have been excised in order to
save the agreement.
Another important decision was Pryor v. Franklin 53
in which the Labor Commissioner voided the manage-
ment agreement between Richard Pryor and David
Franklin. Franklin was ordered to return the manage-
ment commissions he had received between 1975 and
1980, as well as the fees he had received as an executive
producer on films in which Pryor appeared, for an aggre-
gate of $3,110,918 (inclusive of interest). Franklin had
promised to secure employment for Pryor and had, in
fact, negotiated numerous deals. He had dismissed
Pryor's former agents (as well as Pryor's former attorney,
accountant, and other personal representatives) and held
himself out to third parties as Pryor's "agent." Franklin's
defenses were (1) that he had not instigated negotiations,
but merely "furthered" offers which came in from third
parties and (2) that he was an attorney. Special Hearing
Officer Joseph rejected both theories. He observed that if
Franklin's first defense were valid, the Talent Agencies
Act would never apply to those artists who were in great-
est demand. SHO Joseph rejected the second claim
because of the absence of proof that Franklin was
licensed to practice either in Georgia-where he made
his office-or in California. The ruling made clear, how-
ever, that it did not have to reach the question of whether
an attorney's license to practice law in California would
excuse the lack of a talent agency license.
So, can an attorney/manager rest easily, protected
securely by his/her license to practice law?
Not in the view of the Labor Commission. In a March
2, 1999, telephone interview, David Gurley, Staff
Counsel for the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
of the Department of Industrial Relations, stated:
[C]learly there is a fiduciary duty that has to
be met. And as such, the fiduciary duty
requires licensure. We don't exempt attorneys
from being required to be licensed as talent
agents. I think that attorneys, after taking the
bar exam, should have a clear concept of what
their fiduciary responsibilities are. Neverthe-
less, the Labor Commission takes each appli-
cant individually and does a background check
independently of the California Bar and
requires them to be licensed as well. 5
4
This position will not sit well with the legal communi-
ty, since Chapter 4 of the Business & Professions Code 55
establishes a highly detailed structure for the bar and its
administration. An attorney's qualifications 5 6 are estab-
lished at a level far higher than those prescribed for tal-
ent agents, as are the duties required of an attorney. 57
The disciplinary aspects of Chapter 4 are similarly rigor-
ous; for example, under §6106,
The commission of any act involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether
the act is committed in the course of [the attor-
ney's] relations as an attorney or otherwise,
and whether the act is a felony or misde-
meanor or not, constitutes a cause for disbar-
ment or suspension.
The Code prescribes detailed requirements for fee agree-
ments. 58 Mandatory fee arbitration is available at the
election of the client. 59 When these statutory provisions
are combined with the Rules of Professional Conduct, it
is clear that the bar is set far higher for attorneys than
for talent agents. In the opinion of the author, it is there-
fore questionable (except from the standpoint of unifor-
mity of enforcement) whether a second license should be
required of an attorney. In the words of commentator
James M. O'Brien III,
[A]ttorneys should be exempted because the
[Talent Agencies] Act was never intended to
apply to their activities. ... The Professional
Rules and the State Bar Act ... provide greater
protection to artists than the [Talent Agencies]
Act does... and are sufficient to safeguard artists
from any unscrupulous conduct by lawyers."
60
As far as the author is aware, there are no court decisions
on this issue. However, given the fact that the vast
majority of music publishing deals are negotiated by
attorneys, it seems inevitable that litigation will eventu-
ate in this area. In Tobin v. Chinn,6 1 Special Hearing
Officer Locker observed that the recording contract
exemption "does not expressly extend to the procurement
of music publishing contracts" (underlining in original).
Further, "exemptions must be strictly construed," and
"music publishing and recording are two separate
endeavors .... Music publishing and songwriting does not
fall within the recording exemption."
A manager who confined her involvement in the
employment area to creative matters was protected,
however, in Barr v. Rothberg. 62 In that instance, unlike
the situation in Prvor, Roseanne Barr had a licensed tal-
ent agent as well as an attorney. Although Barr's man-
ager attended and took part in contract negotiations,
attorney Barry Hirsch acted as lead negotiator, and the
manager confined herself to "creative" issues. Even more
latitude was afforded a manager working in conjunction
with an agent in Snipes v. Dolores Robinson
Entertainment, 6 3 in which the agent brought the man-
ager in as part of a manager/attorney/agent team.
Although the manager sometimes directly negotiated
aspects of employment agreements (such as "perks," and,
on occasion, compensation), there was no violation
because there was "no showing of subterfuge or an
attempt to circumvent the law."
The Talent Agencies Act itself came under attack in
Wachs v. Curry 64 in which Robert Wachs, the longtime
manager of Arsenio Hall, asserted that the Act was
unconstitutional because the term "occupation of procur-
ing employment" was void for vagueness. The court
rejected this after reviewing the history of the Talent
Agencies Act, noting that the definition had been shifted
so as to concentrate on the employment aspects of the
relationship rather than the management aspects. 65 The
court then went on to posit what appeared to be a new test:
the significance of the agent's employment
procurement function compared to the agent's
business as a whole. If the agent's employment
constitutes a significant part of the agent's
business as a whole, then he or she is subject
to the ... Act even if, with respect to a particu-
lar client, procurement of employment was
only an incidental part of the agent's overall
duties. On the other hand, if counseling and
directing the clients' careers constitutes the
significant part of the agent's business then he
or she is not subject to the ... Act, even if, with
respect to a particular client, counseling and
directing the client's career was only an inci-
dental part of the agent's activities"66 (empha-
sis supplied).
To those who might end up scratching their heads while
trying to comprehend this formulation, the court stated,
"What constitutes a 'significant part' of the agent's business
is an element of degree we need not decide in this case."
6 7
Thereafter, in Church v. Brown,68 Special Hearing
Officer Reich explained the Wachs discussion in the fol-
lowing manner:
The word "significant" is defined in the
American Heritage Dictionary as follows:
"Having or expressing a meaning; meaning-
ful." This definition, coupled with the obvious
purpose of the Wachs court, seems to imply
that the conduct which constitutes an impor-
tant part of the relationship constitutes a "sig-
nificant" portion of the activities of an agent if
the procurement is not due to inadvertence or
mistake and the activities of procurement have
some importance and are not simply a de min-
imis aspect of the overall relationship between
the parties when compared with the agent's
counseling functions on behalf of the artist.
69
Not long after that, another panel of the same appel-
late court which had decided Wachs v. Curry handed
down its decision in Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions,
Inc.,70 rejecting the above-quoted dictum in Wachs. It
held instead that a personal manager would require a
talent agency license even when he devoted only an inci-
dental portion of his business to the agency function.
According to Division of Labor Standards Staff Counsel
David Gurley,
The Labor Commissioner feels that the line is
a strict bright-line rule, where any incidental
procurement of employment would require
licensure under the Act. So if a manager in any
way is attempting to procure, or offering, or
even promising to procure, even to the point of
having incidental conversation about potential
jobs, that's going to require licensure. We've
created a bright-line test as much as is possible
to be able to distinguish between managers and
agents. Case law determines this rule. In the
Waisbren case, it says "any incidental procure-
ment of employment." We're just following the
case law as it's been brought down.
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In sum, then, subject to further word from the appel-
late courts, any employment/procurement activity other
than (1) securing a recording contract, or (2) working in
conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent
agent, can cause grief under the Talent Agencies Act.
However, the Labor Commission takes the position
that its jurisdiction does not extend to a "packaging" sit-
uation proposed by a manager, 72 and recent cases indi-
cate that "procurement" activities are not involved where
the artist is employed by an entity owned by the manag-
er. In Tobin v. Chinn,73 there was no violation when a
manager signed an artist to a recording/music publishing
agreement with his own company as well as a personal
management agreement. In his status as record compa-
ny, the manager/owner arranged for and paid for the
artist's recordings, "shopped" them to distributor labels, and
behaved in other ways as a functioning record production
company. In the words of Special Hearing Officer Locker,
74
[A] person or entity who employs an artist does
not "procure" employment for that artist, with-
in the meaning of Labor Code section
1700.04(a), by directly engaging the services of
that artist. ... [T]he activity of "procuring
employment," under the Talent Agencies Act,
refers to the role an agent plays when acting
as an intermediary between the artist whom the
agent represents and a third-party employer.
Continuing on, SHO Locker made a statement which
is bound to resonate with the new breed of entrepreneur-
ial management companies:
Petitioners' novel argument would mean that
every television or film production company
that directly hires an actor, and that every
concert producer that directly engages the
services of a musical group, without undertak-
ing any communications or negotiations with
the actor's or musical group's talent agent,
would itself need to be licensed as a talent
agency. ... To suggest that any person who
engages the services of an artist for himself is
engaged in the occupation of procuring
employment ... is to radically expand the reach
of the Talent Agencies Act beyond recognition.
SHO Locker distinguished Humes v. MarGil Ventures
Inc., 75 where a "theatrical production company" existed
"in name only" and "was not engaged in the production of
any entertainment or theatrical enterprise, but merely
functioned as a loan-out company." A similar conclusion
was reached in Rose v. Reilly, 7 6 in which the
Commissioner found an agency relationship despite the
presence of a "television production company." The
claimant was never employed directly by the "production
company" and was never on salary. All compensation
came via a third party. In addition, depending on the pro-
duction, the director/client might be employed by the
advertiser which utilized his services in connection with
its commercials.
Although the personal management agreement in
Tobin was part of an interlinked contractual arrange-
ment, and although the form allowed the manager to
"prepare, negotiate, consummate, sign, execute and
deliver" contracts for the artist, this did not cause the
arrangement to collapse. The form contained the usual
disclaimer that the manager was not "an employment
agent, theatrical agent, or artist's manager" and that he
"[was] not permitted, obligated, authorized or expected to
do so." Further, the manager would,
consult with and advise Artist with respect to
the selection, engagement and discharge of
theatrical agents, artists' managers, employ-
me;1it agencies and booking agents ... but man-
agev is not authorized to select, engage, dis-
cha~e or direct any such talent agent in the per-
formance to [sic] the duties of such talent agent.
The manager did not commission revenues under the
recording/publishing agreement.
It seems logical, therefore, under the reasoning in
Tobin v. Chinn, that if a production company is not con-
sidered an agent when it hires an actor directly, there
should be no objection when a manager and a client form
a production company to develop film or television prop-
erties and the production company thereafter signs the
actor to an employment agreement.
Thus, it would appear that managers have consider-
able latitude, so long as the structures they create with
their clients are truly active and not simply pretextual.
THE GATHERING STORM
Until a few years ago, agents predominated in repre-
senting literary authors and stage, film, and television
performers, while managers tended to predominate in
the recording and music publishing fields. According to
Gregg Kilday, a reporter for L.A. MAGAZINE, "It used to be
that only established actors had managers."
7 7 It was
common for managers and agents to work together for
the same client. 78 Now, however, the role of agents in
film and television seems to be declining and the role of
managers in this field seems to be increasing. There are
several reasons for this.
Escalating production and marketing costs have led
many studios to cut the number of theatrical films they
produce and distribute each year. The salaries of top box-
office names (e.g., Tom Cruise, Tom Hanks, Jim Carrey,
Harrison Ford, Mel Gibson, Julia Roberts) have soared
past $20 million (often against a percentage of the gross
receipts rather than the net). Since special effects are
costly and the salaries of "below the line" personnel (basi-
cally, everyone except the producer, director, leading
actors, and writers) are largely determined through col-
lective bargaining, there has been downward pressure on
the salaries of lesser actors. The number of television
series which last long enough to trigger substantial syn-
dication monies (generally a minimum of four years) also
has shrunk. All of this has narrowed the range of possi-
bilities within which many agents work. In addition,
thanks in large measure to the aggressive approach of
Michael Ovitz and Creative Artists Agency over a 20-
year period, there has been a substantial increase in
movement of artists and agents between agencies. In
many cases, agents compete on price, taking less than
the ten percent fee limit prescribed under applicable
union franchise agreements.
Because of the convergence of these negative forces,
the business model adopted by Brillstein-Grey has
become more and more attractive to companies that see
the prospects of talent agencies diminishing. The
Brillstein-Grey Company was something of a pioneer in
creating television series which they owned together with
their management clients. Instead of simply working for
a fee, Bernie Brillstein and Brad Grey were creating
assets. How did they do this?
As Gregg Kilday puts it:
Agents were legally barred from producing
films and TV shows, since, it is argued, to
allow them to do so would lead to inevitable
conflicts of interests. ... Managers, though,
Aents will Be Ajents
DiFFerences Between Agents and
Managers in CaliFornia:
1. Agents are limited to a ten percent
commission by guild agreements and Labor
Commission action, whereas managers typically charge
a 15 percent commission.
2. Agents tend to have a large stable of clients,
who typically do not receive intense personalized
attention, whereas managers have a much smaller
stable of clients, who receive significant personal
attention.
3. The primary role of the agent is the
procurement of employment for the client,
whereas the manager counsels the client in personal
and professional matters in an advisory capacity.
4. Agents are strictly regulated under the Talent
Agencies Act, whereas managers are unregulated in
their professional capacity.
operate under no such restrictions."7 9
Brillstein-Grey produced shows such as The Days and
Nights of Molly Dodd, Buffalo Bill, Alf, Just Shoot Me,
and The Sopranos, all featuring their management
clients. In addition, they produced The Larry Sanders
Show with Gary Shandling. However, Shandling filed
suit against Brillstein-Grey in January 1998, claiming
that they had leveraged his popularity to line their own
pockets without sharing the profits.
8 0
Other firms, such as More-Medavoy (Dharma & Greg)
and Addis-Wechsler (Eve's Bayou, The Player, Love
Jones) have produced television shows and/or films with
their management clients. Prominent longtime agent
Lou Pitt recently left ICM to set up The Pitt Co.
Then came the return of Michael Ovitz. Having left
CAA for the presidency of The Walt Disney Co., Ovitz
and Disney parted company after 14 months. However,
Ovitz did not go away quietly. In addition to his other
activities,8 1  Ovitz recently organized Artists
Management Group, creating instant headlines by
attracting two of Hollywood's hottest managers, Rick
Yorn and his sister-in-law, Julie Silverman Yorn.
Together, they brought with them such names as
Leonardo DiCaprio, Claire Danes, Samuel L. Jackson,
Cameron Diaz, Geena Davis, and Matt Dillon. Then
Ovitz brought in Michael Menchel, a senior agent at
CAA, who represents Robin Williams. For CAA, this was
the last straw; the agency announced it would no longer
represent any talent which signed with AMG for man-
agement services.8 2 This appears to have been only the
first challenge in what may turn out to be a lengthy duel.
The Ldoor Commission's Vew
It appears that managers can lawfully develop film
and television productions with their management
clients, without running afoul of the Talent Agencies Act.
If a manager and his/her client set up a joint venture or
a corporation-under an agreement which provides that
the manager is responsible for financing and producing
entertainment programming, and the talent is responsi-
ble for acting in it-this may provide an eight-lane highway
through the heart of the Talent Agencies Act. However,
based upon the decisions reviewed on pages 9-13, supra,
the Commissioner will not object as long as the entity actu-
ally functions in the manner for which it is intended.
Of course, agents engaged in "packaging" producers,
writers, directors, and actors on the same project can
make serious money from their share of the license fees
charged to the purchaser of the package. This is not con-
sidered by the Labor Commissioner to be within the
scope of the Talent Agencies Act. In an opinion letter
dated June 22, 1959, then-Commissioner Sigmund
Arywitz stated that a packaging agreement form,
is not such as requires the approval of the
Labor Commissioner ... [because] this type of
contract is concerned exclusively with "creative
property or package show" and contains nothing
with respect to the employment of an artist.
8 3
This policy was confirmed by Commissioner Jose
Millan in an October 30, 1998, letter which stated that
the Commissioner,
lack[s] jurisdiction with respect to "Packaging
Agreements." ... A "packaging agreement" or
"package program" as the term is customarily
understood in the television and motion pic-
ture industries is more analogous to selling an
idea or a concept. In packaging agreements,
the requisite obtaining or getting possession
elements are not present. The concept of pack-
aging is a "pitch" that must be sold prior to any
procurement of employment ... [It] is more
analogous to selling an idea or a concept ...
prior to any procurement of employment. After
the idea is sold, and once the artist begins
work under the signed package agreement,
only then would jurisdiction of the Labor
Commissioner commence. ... Furthermore, it
appears that artists benefit from packaging
agreements.
The letter then cited the SAG, AFTRA, DGA, and WGA
guild agreements, all of which approve packaging
arrangements while precluding agents from receiving
fees from artists when the agent also represents the own-
ers or producers of programs. This saves expenses for the
artists. However, while the agent can reap significant
rewards from the packaging fees, the agent can not share
in the ownership of the packaged property.
Can a manager also package in this manner, without
the "cover" of working in conjunction with a licensed tal-
ent agent? Discussions with the office of the Division of
Labor Standards, together with the Labor Commission
decisions cited above, indicates that a manager can do
this if the talent is already employed by the production
company and the manager is therefore literally not
attempting to secure employment for the talent.
Moreover, under this model, the manager-unlike the
agent-can share in the ownership of the package.
If a manager does not wish to (or is not in a position to) fol-
low the production company model, is there safety in distance?
Many managers, of course, make their offices outside
of California and would never-until now-have
dreamed of applying for an agent's license in California.
Is there safety for a manager based out of state who rep-
resents talent resident in California, and who either
works strictly by phone, fax, and e-mail or makes only
occasional trips to California? Does it matter to the Labor
Commission whether or not the talent resides in
California? Because the Talent Agencies Act is remedial
in nature and expressive of a strong public policy
designed to protect artists and performers, the
Commission maintains that it will invoke "long-arm"
jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the United
States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington 84 and in the subsequent cases deriving
therefrom. As an example of the expansiveness of "long-
arm" jurisdiction, in Burger King Corporation v.
Rudzewicz, 8 5 the Supreme Court held that a Florida fran-
chisor was able to obtain jurisdiction over a Michigan fran-
chisee which had never physically entered Florida, because:
it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial
life that a substantial amount of business is
transacted solely by mail and wire communi-
cations across state lines, thus obviating the
need for physical presence within a State with-
in which business is being conducted. So long
as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposeful-
ly directed" toward residents of another state,
we have consistently rejected the notion that
an absence of physical contacts can defeat per-
sonal jurisdiction there.
8 6
"This conflict is not going to go away":
The Kuehl Amendment
Assembly Bill 884 was introduced by California
Assembly Member Sheila James Kuehl on February 25,
1999. Although some observers interpreted the timing of
the bill as a sign that it was focused on the present dis-
pute, a memorandum issued by Member Kuehl's office
states that the bill intends to remedy,
fraudulent representations made to potential
child actors and others by scam artists posing
as "talent managers" ... [and] to ensure that
actors breaking into the business know
whether they are dealing with a reputable
manager who is licensed by the state.
Kuehl's memorandum states that "AB 884 does not alter
the working relationships that exist among agents,
managers, and their clients. '8 7 For example, the memo-
randum states,
managers, in addition to their career develop-
ment responsibilities, will retain the right to
produce. Agents will remain the only entities
licensed to procure employment for their
clients (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, to underscore her intention to avoid inter-
ference with the relationships between agents and man-
agers and their respective clients, Kuehl met with 80
managers on March 12, 1999, at the Hollywood Roosevelt
Hotel. There, she stated her willingness to revise and
amend AB 884. "I'm very likely to narrow the bill to deal
with the fraud aspect. ... I'm not interested in regulating
an industry that doesn't need to be regulated." However, she
said, "I'm telling you that this conflict between managers and
agents, if there is any, is not going to go away."
88
The Amendment
would add a new
Chapter 4.5, entitled
"Artist's Manager," to
Division 2 of the Labor
Code. An "artist's man-
ager" is defined as a
person who does one or
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"may counsel, or direct
artists in the development
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careers, it is easy to see
why the traditional agents
are alarmed at what they
perceive as an increasing
invasion of their turf by
essentially unregulated
competition.
the artist's manager can or will provide any of
the following services to artists for a fee: career
counseling, vocational guidance, aptitude test-
ing, executive consulting, personal consulting,
career management, evaluation, or planning,
or the development of resumes and other pro-
motional materials relating to the preparation
for employment as an artist. 89
The definition "does not include a person licensed as a
talent agency" pursuant to §1700.5.90
Apart from "vocational guidance" and "aptitude test-
ing," which would appear to be categories found in the
child actor arena-Assembly Member Kuehl's avowed
area of concern-all of the above describes the typical
personal manager.
AB 884 would require an artist's manager to obtain a
license from the Labor Commissioner, 9 1 the application
for which must disclose "the business or occupation
engaged in by the applicant for at least [the last] two
years, '9 2 and must be accompanied by affidavits of:
at least two reputable residents of the city or
county in which the business is to be conduct-
ed who have known or been associated with
the applicant for two years, [and who attest]
that the applicant is a person of good moral
character or, in the case of a corporation, has a
reputation for fair dealing.
9 3
As is the case with agents, the initial license fee would
be $25,94 and there would be a $225 annual renewal
fee, 9 5 as well as a $10,000 bond.
9 6
If the Commissioner revokes a manager's license,
there can be no new license for three years thereafter.
97
As is now required of agents,9 8 a manager would be
required to submit proposed forms of contracts to the
Commissioner for approval, which could not be withheld
"unless the proposed form of contract is unfair, unjust
and oppressive to the artist."9 9 As is the case with
agents, 10 0 a manager would have to file a schedule of
fees. 10 1 Like the agent, 10 2 the manager would have to
establish a trust fund for monies collected for clients, and
would have to disburse (subject to legitimate offset) with-
in 30 days after receipt.
10 3
The rest of the bill similarly parallels the provisions of
the existing Chapter 4, with one major exception: there
are no provisions equivalent to the dispute determination
procedure set forth §1700.44.104 Therefore, a licensed
manager and his/her/its client would resolve their con-
tractual disputes in the same manner as now prevails in
New York-in the courts (or, if the parties so provide in
their contracts, by arbitration). However, that would
apply presumably only where the dispute involved con-
duct by a manager within the scope of the license; if the
manager were to procure, offer to procure, attempt to
procure, or promise to procure employment for a client,
the client could then invoke the doctrines described om
pages 9-13, supra.
Therefore, it seems to the author that-at least as
presently written-AB 884 would accomplish precisely
what Assembly Member Kuehl's explanatory memoran-
dum suggests: "Agents will remain the only entities
licensed to procure employment for their clients."
Thus, the basic conflict between agents and managers
in California remains to be resolved.
WAITING FOR THE
HOLLYWOOD HAPPY ENDING
The essential issues which divide agents and man-
agers show no signs of abating any time soon. At this
writing, the statutory and case law of New York appears
to afford considerably more lenient treatment to the
manager who procures work for a client than does the
statutory and case law of California. However,
California managers can achieve considerable "wiggle
room" either by working in conjunction with licensed
agents or by establishing working production companies
with their clients. The ultimate outcome of the latest
feud between the agents and the managers in California
cannot be predicted, although it would seem that the
managers are thriving at the present moment. They may
take a considerable amount of business away from the
agents through judicious use of the "packaging exemp-
tion," originally accorded to agents, and by establishing
real production entities. However, as presently written,
the Kuehl Amendment does not address the concerns of
managers such as Robert Wachs who, rightly or wrongly,
feel that they are treated unfairly because they act as
agents by default-only to be discarded once their clients
achieve success, often with ruinous repayment obliga-
tions. A licensed California attorney negotiating con-
tracts (other than a recording contract) for a client may
be at risk, and managers or attorneys based outside of
New York and California may find themselves subject to
long-arm jurisdiction in those states if the "minimum
standards" requirement of the International Shoe line of
cases are met. *
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